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1. Introduction:!
! Walking home on a Sunday morning from a local pizza parlor in Ballymena, Northern 
Ireland, three Catholic teenagers were set upon by a gang of Protestant youths (“Sectarian 
Divide” 18). While two of the three friends escaped, the third, a 15-year old named Michael 
McIlveen, was beaten severely with baseball bats (“Sectarian Divide” 18). He died of his injuries 
in the hospital the following morning (“Sectarian Divide” 18).
 This incident, reminiscent of the sectarian violence prevalent during Northern Ireland’s 
historic bout with ‘The Troubles’, occurred in 2006, nearly eight years after the Good Friday 
Agreement was signed in Belfast officially declaring peace in the region (“Sectarian Divide” 18). 
Sectarian violence involving Northern Irish youth is perhaps less commonplace than during the 
Troubles. Nevertheless, as Michael McIlveen unwillingly demonstrates, the failure to address 
sectarianism in the youth context can be just as fatal. 
 Moreover, incidents such as McIlveen’s beating, although no longer commonplace, are 
again on the rise (“Security Situation” 2). This year, nearly twelve years since the Peace 
Agreement was signed, Northern Ireland has witnessed an alarming upsurge in sectarian activity, 
much of it either initiated or aided by youth involvement (“Security Situation” 3). Periods of 
non-violence following  peace agreements on average have a lifespan of only five years fifteen 
years (“Impasse” 13). Many are cautioning that this recent increase in youth violence in Northern 
Ireland could mean the end to the region’s fragile peace, stating that “the apparent willingness of 
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some of our young people to embrace violence indicates that we have much to do to overcome 
sectarianism and segregation” (Young 14).
2. Statement of the Problem Under Consideration:
 Muldoon’s article published in 2004, “Children of the Troubles: The Impact of Political 
Violence in Northern Ireland” presents a review of academic literature addressing the issue of the 
impact of sectarian conflict upon young people in Northern Ireland. In this article, Muldoon first 
contextualizes her review within the dominant academic paradigm emphasizing that 
experiencing politically-motivated violence carries a significant risk to children’s healthy 
development (454). Further, Muldoon rightly asserts that the in-group/out-group identities 
serving as the basis for sectarian attitudes are formed during childhood. (454). As all children in 
Northern Ireland in the years following the cease-fire have grown up in a divided society prone 
to episodic sectarian violence, in preventing conflict, it is important to study not only the 
developmental impact that such experiences have upon youth, but also youth’s understanding of 
their own sociopolitical identities within a sectarian context. 
  My goal throughout the course of this paper is to examine youth’s experiences with and 
understandings of sectarian violence in the years since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement 
in 2008. In particular, I wish to focus upon the period following publication of Muldoon’s article 
in 2004, and limit my analysis to current episodes of sectarian violence and their implications for 
youth and for the peace process as a whole. Rather than simply concentrating upon the 
psychopathological aspects of youth development in the realm of violent political conflict, I 
intend to produce a holistic interpretation of the ways in which Northern Ireland youth have 
navigated the space of sectarian violence in their schools and communities, both by their 
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involvement and opposition to ethno-religious polarization. By comparing these results with 
Muldoon’s 2004 article, I hope to demonstrate to what degree progress is being made to end 
sectarian violence implicating the youngest members of Northern Irish society. 
3. The Troubles, An Historical Perspective:
 No comprehensive review of youth violence in Northern Ireland since the signing of the 
comprehensive peace agreement in 1998 can begin without at least a basic understanding of the 
grievances associated with it’s centuries-long conflict. The period of heightened sectarian 
violence from 1969 to 1998 euphemistically dubbed “The Troubles” had its roots most decisively  
in the Ulster Plantation of 1609 (Muldoon 458). Since the 12th century invasion by King Henry 
the II, England had been endeavoring to establish its rule over Ireland, and encouraged Protestant 
settlers to establish a presence in the yet unconquered northernmost ‘Ulster’ province (Muldoon 
458). Tensions mounted between the native Irish Catholics and the Protestant settlers, who 
identified themselves along different cultural, religious, and territorial divides (Muldoon 458). 
The Catholics believed that their land and independence had been stolen from them, while 
Protestants felt under constant siege by their neighbors (Muldoon 458). 
 After a bloody civil war, Britain sought to find a compromise between the two groups by 
partitioning the island into two territories (Muldoon 458). Thus, six of the nine original counties 
in the Ulster province became Northern Ireland, and remained under British rule, while the rest 
were granted independence and became the Republic of Ireland (Muldoon 458). Catholics in 
Northern Ireland, who comprised nearly 35% of the population, were virtually denied political 
representation and discriminated against primarily in housing and education (Muldoon 458-459).  
Moreover, police forces were comprised almost entirely of Protestants and the British military 
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maintained a strong presence in the country (Muldoon 459). Paramilitary groups like the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (Catholic, Nationalist), as well as the Ulster Volunteer Force 
and Ulster Defense Association (Protestant, Loyalist) sought to establish their own idea of justice 
in the wake of Catholic demands for greater civil rights (Muldoon 459). The result was nearly 
three decades of assassinations, shootings, and bombings that left 3,000 dead and 30,000 injured 
while scarring the lives of all those who grew up in the region (Muldoon 457).
4. The Troubles’ Impact on Youth up to 2004:
 While the Northern Ireland conflict has been largely described in terms of a struggle 
between opposing religious factions, our historical overview demonstrates that religion is not the 
sole determinant in discriminating between Catholics and Protestants in the region. Their 
grievances are based on a shared history of victimhood in the realm of social, political and 
cultural determination. As such, it is important to consider the impact of sectarian conflict among 
youth in Northern Ireland within this broader frame of reference which encompasses 
sociopolitical and cultural dimensions of the Troubles. 
 Muldoon’s article provides an excellent overview of scholarly literature prior to 2004 
discussing the impact of the Troubles upon the everyday lives of youth in Northern Ireland. The 
author asserts that the severity and longevity of the consequences of growing up in this divided 
society have long been debated, and that most recently these children’s capacity for resilience  
has again been questioned (Muldoon 461). Resilience, defined by Masten, Best and Garmezy as 
“the process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or 
threatening circumstances” is most often contrasted with the concept of risk in analyzing 
children’s experiences of conflict (Howard 1). In Northern Ireland, Muldoon suggests, children 
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are most likely at risk of developing externalized behaviors in response to their chaotic 
environment.
 However, prior to 2004, there is little evidence of externalized behaviors among Northern 
Irish youth (Muldoon 461). Some researchers have demonstrated increased levels of antisocial 
behavior, behavioral maladjustment, and psychoticism among schoolchildren, yet truancy and 
delinquency are as yet, unassociated with the conflict (Muldoon 461). Drug use among 
adolescents has increased since the Troubles however, perhaps due to lapses in pressure from 
churches, security forces and paramilitaries for youth to remain drug free (Muldoon 461). 
Nevertheless, the most prevalent effects of the conflict can be observed in the marginalization 
and deprivation of young people of diverse backgrounds.
 Conflict experiences in Northern Ireland remain inherently inequitable. Youth in 
situations of socioeconomic distress, and in particular boys and ethnic minorities have had 
greater exposure to sectarian conflict (Muldoon 462). Ostracized from social and legal protective 
mechanisms, these youth feel the weight of sectarian conflict most heavily, and often view 
violence as the only viable solution to inequality and oppression (Muldoon 462). As issues of 
social justice and equity are the essence of sectarian conflict in the region, these youth relate to 
identities which shape their environment in terms of sectarian divides and violence (Muldoon 
462).
 These identities are central to both the experience of sectarian violence in Northern 
Ireland and the perpetuation of the conflict itself (Muldoon 462). Cassidy and Trew’s study 
demonstrates, however that student, family and friend identities are beginning to overtake 
sectarian identities in terms of salience among young people (Muldoon 463). Nevertheless, 
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McAuley’s work with loyalist youth suggests that young Protestants feel threatened by efforts 
towards achieving a ‘New Northern Ireland’ and alienated from a peace process drafted in 
essentially exclusionist terms (Muldoon 463). Perceived distance from political institutions and 
processes is not merely a Protestant phenomenon, however. Whyte and Schermbrucker report a 
lapse in political engagement and increasing feelings of distance from political institutions 
among youth across cultures in Northern Ireland (Muldoon 463). 
 Specifically, education constitutes a public domain where sectarian divides are 
understood all the more distinctly. Yet, although schooling remains largely segregated in 
Northern Ireland, children studied by McLernon, Cairns, Hewstone and Smith who were 
bereaved, or suffered physical injury or verbal abuse associated with the Troubles demonstrated 
high forgiveness scores (Muldoon 463). Muldoon suggests that this evidence provides substantial 
reason to hope in the achievement of true reconciliation in Northern Ireland’s future.
5. Sectarian Violence since Muldoon’s 2004 Review:
 While Muldoon’s “Children of the Troubles: The Impact of Political Violence in Northern 
Ireland” presents many promising new developments towards reconciling the country’s history 
of sectarian violence with its present peace, it is important to note that the review was published 
at at time when sectarian violence was at its lowest in recent memory (“Recorded Crime” 3). 
According to the Police Service Northern Ireland’s annual statistical reports, crime during this 
period had decreased significantly, by 7.7%, and was at its lowest level in six years (“Recorded 
Crime 2004” 3). Rates of violent crime, burglary, theft, criminal damage (including bombings), 
fraud, forgery and offenses against the state (including terrorist activities) also all markedly 
decreased at the population level (“Recorded Crime 2004” 3). Given a context in which sectarian 
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conflict appeared to be on the downturn, Muldoon’s article may reflect a spirit of optimism 
prevalent during this period.
 Six years since Muldoon’s review was published, sectarian violence among youth is far 
from a thing of the past. Consulting the Police Service Northern Ireland’s annual statistics again, 
I found a significant increase in overall crime rates, including violent crime, burglary, theft, and 
criminal damage over the past year (“Recorded Crime 2008” 3). While these may simple 
correlate to Northern Ireland’s present economic slump, the figures relating to offenses against 
the state, and in particular, sectarian conflict are much more telling. The number of offenses 
committed against the state rose to 275 in the past year, a 24.3% increase, with crimes under 
anti-terrorism legislation rising 2.9%, petrol bombing offenses rising 12.3%, and assaults on 
police rising 13.2% (“Recorded Crime 2008” 3). Specifically, the number of shootings, casualties 
from paramilitary attacks, and paramilitary style assaults all significantly increased, even as the 
number of bombing incidents doubled (“Security Situation” 3).  Far from an anomaly, these 
figures represent a trend towards a resurgence of sectarian conflict that has been mounting in the 
years following publication of Muldoon’s article.
 Since 2004, extensive rioting, school vandalism, assaults and gang clashes related to 
sectarian activity have all been reported and highly publicized in the Irish media. The majority of  
Northern Irish residents have responded by urging swift action to quell sectarian conflict and 
condemning reprisals, while remaining optimistic that relations between Catholics and 
Protestants are on the up and up (Moriarty 12). Nevertheless, recent surveys suggest that nearly 
30% of the population had ‘a lot’ of sympathy for republican violence, with 29% having ‘a lot’ of 
sympathy for loyalist violence. Political consultant Robin Wilson asserted that “the survey 
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results highlight a a lack of consensus on issues that are central to the functioning of a peaceful 
democracy - such as opposition to political violence, the right to protest, and the presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty” (Moriarty 12). This has given many Northern Irish residents 
reason for concern that the peace process in the region may be on the verge of collapse if 
sectarian violence is not addressed succinctly and efforts made towards integration and cultural 
understanding (Young 14).
6. Youth Involvement in Sectarian Conflict since 2004:
 What is perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that many of these incidents have been 
perpetrated by youth, some as young as ten years old (“Children Urged” 10). Singer’s book 
raised concern over the fact that since the signing of the peace agreement, dissident republican 
paramilitary, the ‘Real IRA.’ has been recruiting boys between the ages of 14-16 in order to 
expand its recruiting base and compete with rival paramilitaries (Singer 117-118). Yet, much of 
the disorder occurring since 1998, though rooted in sectarianism, has been perpetrated by youth 
unaffiliated with paramilitary forces (Smyth 1). 
 Some paramilitaries even appear to be aware of the social ramifications of recruiting 
children. Ulster Young Militants have released a statement assuring that they do not recruit 
anyone under the age of 16 (Smyth). Yet it was a 17 year old boy - a member of the Real IRA -
who in 2009 shot two soldiers in their early twenties and a policeman in the first killing of a 
police force member since the Belfast Agreement (“Rally Condemns” 8). Nevertheless, the 
majority of the violent behavior now being committed in Northern Ireland has been instigated by 
loosely organized groups from the same community, rather than formal gangs or paramilitaries 
(Smyth 1). 
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 As guns are tightly controlled by the rival paramilitary forces, these youth are forced 
operate utilize blast bombs, and carry knives or other weapons (Smyth 1). Their weapons are 
crude, and their collective cause is ambiguous at best (Smyth 1). While espousing ‘Loyalist’ or 
‘Republican’ monikers, they remain politically disengaged, as opposed to their pre-1998 
counterparts who idealized their struggle in overt sociopolitical tones (Smyth 1). Facing the fear 
of discrimination by the police and indifference among politicians, these youngsters have taken 
to policing their own territory, tending to focus their efforts on self-defense against outsiders 
(Smyth 1). Research conducted by Leonard in 2006 reinforces this assertion, as North Belfast 
children described restricting their movement to locales controlled by individuals of their own 
sect, drawing sectarian graffiti demarcating boundaries between the two communities, and even 
engaging in sectarian conflict in liminal spaces where these boundaries remained ambiguous (1).
 These youth’s efforts to reinforce sectarian territory have culminated in sporadic riots 
since the time Muldoon’s article was published. Despite an obvious lack of weaponry, these 
youth were active participants in rioting that constituted “some of the worst violence Northern 
Ireland has seen in a number of years” (“Children Urged” 16). Children as young as ten years old 
were involved, exemplified by footage taken of a 14-year old boy coolly throwing a petrol bomb 
at a nearby Range Rover amidst the chaos (“Rioting Children” 16). Interestingly, participation in 
the riots was fueled by text and video messages (“Children Urged” 16). One constable remarked, 
“ You would think they were at Euro Disney rather than a riot. They are recording it on their 
phones and passing it on to others through those social networking sites” (“Children Urged” 16). 
This incident presents 21st century complications for the maintenance of order in so-called 
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‘interface zones’ as youth used social networking tools in order to spur one another on to commit 
violent acts.
 While it’s true that in some areas of Northern Ireland, sectarian violence has decreased 
even since 2004, in neighborhoods where interface violence has decreased, youth-led riots have 
been readily instigated. A study conducted by Hansonn in 2005 found that in interface areas 
where violence had decreased, youth expressed a desire for rioting and general mayhem in order 
to escape the boredom and apathy that surrounded their everyday lives (1). In a desperate 
endeavor to shed the realities of a life lacking in opportunities and the limitations of a separate 
peace, these youth have run rampant, virtually holding cities neighborhoods in the process. As 
one reporter questioned, “Why are we allowing children and young teenagers to call all the shots 
in Northern Ireland?” (“Rioting Children” 16).
7. Sectarian Violence Since 2004, The Racial Dimension:
 While Muldoon’s article mentions the compounded experiences of sectarian violence for 
ethnic minorities, it does not address youth attitudes towards immigrants and how the experience 
of sectarianism has primed youth already involved in anomic violent behavior to address these 
other ‘outsiders’ within their communities. Since publication of Muldoon’s article in 2004, there 
has been a marked upsurge in racially-motivated attacks in Northern Ireland. During the 2009 
riots, more than 100 Romanians were forced to seek refuge on church grounds in Belfast under 
threat by gunmen (McGinty 16). Several of these incidents have been perpetrated by youth, 
namely the aforementioned riots in 2009, during which  youngsters scrawled, “No sympathy for 
foreigners, get out of our Queen's country before our bonfire night (July 11) and parade day (July  
12). Other than that your building will be blown up ...” (“Rioting Children” 16). 
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 While certainly neither maturely or eloquently verbalized, these threats should not be 
taken lightly after considering that last year alone there were 771 racist crimes committed in 
Northern Ireland (McGinty 16). Currently, the number of racially-motivated incidents remains 
behind the number of sectarian attacks (McGinty 16). Nevertheless, as right-wing, anti-Islamist 
group the English Defense League has now joined up with the Ulster Defense Association, these 
instances are sure to be magnified in the near future (Goldby 19). Further, these recent incidents 
suggest a shift from sectarian violence founded in political idealism to violence based on in-
group/out-group characteristics.
8. Sectarian Violence since 2004, Comparative Implications for Youth:
 While Muldoon’s article claims that internalized behaviors among youth such as 
depression can not be generalized at the population level, recent findings suggest that both 
internalized and externalized mental health concerns are on the rise in the wake of mounting 
tensions since 2004. A comparative study of Israeli and Northern Irish youth conducted in 2009 
found that the huge increase in community violence since the signing of the peace agreement has 
resulted in a rise in anti-social behavior, and abnormal behavioral and emotional difficulties 
(“Study Compares” 22).  Further, a study initiated by Tomlinson in 2007 concluded that 
registered suicide rates in Northern Ireland are on a sharply rising curve (438). Suicides among 
young men aged 15-24 doubled, while the total number rose to 291 in 2006 (Tomlinson 438). 
These results all point toward an increase in mental health issues correlated with an upsurge in 
sectarian violence.
 Concurring with Muldoon’s spirit of optimism however, the implications of the increase 
in sectarian violence since 2004 have not been entirely destructive. Rather, in voicing opposition 
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to sectarianism, Northern Irish youth have been able to navigate the challenging divide between 
apathy and complicity with sectarian violence, and have become politically engaged as a result 
of their efforts. More than fifty youth stormed the Parliament at Stormont in June of 2009, 
meeting with the Minister and Deputy First Minister to address interface violence (“Teens Push” 
4). In this instance we see that the recent increase in sectarian violence has actually provided the 
opportunity for young people to get involved in the political process.
9. Conclusion:
  Nevertheless, youth involvement in sectarian conflict since 2004 has shown a marked 
increase since 2004. As demonstrated, youth perpetration of sectarian violence since the signing 
of the peace agreement remains largely outside of the confines of established paramilitary 
groups. Yet, rioting and anomic violence associated with protection of sectarian territory can 
prove just as deadly when coupled with the prolific use of crude bombing devices. Furthermore, 
this sectarian violence in the aim of preserving territorial boundaries now has a racial dimension, 
and can be assisted through prevalent social networking technology. Finally, while increased 
youth perpetration of sectarian conflict has recently been demonstrated to result in both 
internalized and externalized behavioral problems, youths’ utilization of political engagement as 
a means to achieve peace provides hope for reconciliation and highlights an opportunity for 
resourcefulness presented by sectarian violence. 
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